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Abstract 
Assessing the reliability of complex systems (e.g. structures) is essential for a reliability-based optimal 
design that balances safety and costs of such systems.  This paper proposes the Progressive Reliability 
Method (PRM) for the quantification of the reliability of complex systems. The proposed method is a 
closed-form solution for calculating the probability of failure. The new method is flexible to the definition 
of “failure” (i.e., can consider serviceability and ultimate-strength failures) and uses the rules of 
probability theory to estimate the failure probability of the system or its components. The method is first 
discussed in general and then illustrated in two examples, including a case study to find the safest 
configuration and orientation of a 12-line offshore mooring system. The PRM results are compared with 
results of a similar assessment based on the Monte Carlo simulations. It is shown in the example of two-
component that using PRM, the importance of system components to system safety can be quantified and 
compared as input information for maintenance planning. 
1 Introduction 
The safety and cost-effectiveness of a system can be maximized if a reliability-based method is used for 
its design. For example, the safety of a structural system usually depends on numerous random variables, 
including environmental demands (loads), material properties and structural capacities (strengths.) 
Therefore, the safety of such system is uncertain. In practice, for the design of reliable structures, a 
number of safety criteria are fulfilled as recommended by design codes, normally through the use of 
factors of safety (FoS). Using FoSs that locally assesses the system safety has been practiced for many 
years and has produced structures that function under various circumstances. However, concerns remain 
in terms of the system reliability. Using FoS provides little quantitative information about the overall 
reliability of the structural systems. In turn, quantitative reliability methods quantify the system safety and 
reliability in terms of their failure probability and provide a basis for changing and optimizing the design 
variables to achieve sufficiently safe structures that are not overdesigned. 
This paper proposes a Progressive Reliability Method (PRM) as a closed-form solution for quantifying 
the system reliability using the basic rules of the probability theory. This general method can compute the 
probability of system failure in terms of its functionality and performance or the failure of certain system 
components (this method is flexible to the definition of system failure.) For example, in structural 
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engineering, the maximum deformation of the structure to a certain level or the ultimate-strength failure 
of one or some of the system components usually defines the system failure. In a PRM, the reliability 
assessment accounts for the possible progressive failures of the system components until the system 
failure criterion is met. Such assessment requires calculating the probability of various failure scenarios 
and calculating the probability of system failure under each scenario. Because after each component 
failure, the probability space of the remaining components changes (due to the redistribution of the 
demands), and any damaged state of the system may occur through multiple failure scenarios, a general 
solution that accounts for all such complexities is developed.  
The PRM uses known rules of probability to formulate a general method for calculating the reliability of 
complex systems. The proposed method provides a closed-form solution that accounts for the dynamic 
changes in the stochastic model associated with the possible progressive failures of the components. This 
general method captures the complexities that are not captured when only one or two failures of a limited 
number of components are considered. For example, multiple paths can lead to the same damaged 
systems with several failed components. By using the well-known total probability rule, converting the 
problem to a fragility (conditional probability of system failure given system demands) problem, and 
making the assumption that only one component fails at a time, PRM is a novel formulation based on 
known concepts to compute the probability of failure of complex systems. 
A PRM can be applied in the design of many complex systems. As an illustration, this paper shows how 
the proposed method can be applied to an offshore mooring system. Offshore mooring systems are 
important structures, especially in development of oil and gas drilling and production systems. The main 
function of a mooring system is to maintain a floating structure within a certain offset of its still position. 
The offshore industry has used several mooring systems in deepwaters; however, some of them have 
failed during service or extreme conditions. A mooring system consists of multiple mooring lines. Each 
line includes a few components. Because of the uncertainties in the strength of the system components 
and the environmental loads, a reliability-based design optimization can improve the design of the 
mooring systems more accurately than the conventional FoS-based methods. Furthermore, the failure of 
any individual component in a mooring system does not necessarily compromise its functionality; 
therefore, a PRM can be used for an unbiased and comprehensive reliability-based optimization. 
Calculating the probability of failure of offshore mooring systems or their components has been the 
subject of a number of studies in the last few years. Stiff et al. [1] calculated the probability of failure of 
mooring systems using a closed-form solution accounting for the ultimate-strength (overloading) failure 
only and based on a quadratic model for the failure of the individual line components. Shah et al. [2] 
assessed the reliability of mooring systems by calculating the probability that incoming waves have a 
frequency near the natural frequency of the mooring system. The reliability of individual components and 
individual lines in a mooring system was discussed by Vazquez-Hernandez et al. [3] and Montes-
Iturrizaga et al. [4] concerning the design criteria and a method to quantify the probability of a component 
failure in an intact system. Grimea and Langley [5] used a simplified model to compare the probability of 
failure of mooring systems under different extreme environmental loads. Ku et al. [6] performed a limited 
number of Monte Carlo simulations to estimate the probability of mooring system failure with various 
system properties. The probability of failure of suction caissons in mooring systems was discussed by 
Najjar and Gilbert [7]. Montes-Iturrizaga et al. [8] also analyzed individual mooring lines for their 
reliability and used a new equation to calculate the probability of failure of the individual lines in the 
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intact system. Mousavi and Gardoni [9] calculated the probability of failure of mooring systems using 
Monte Carlo simulation and a new definition for the failure based on system functionality by making the 
assumption that one mooring component fails at a time.  
The main function of a mooring system is to maintain a vessel within an allowable offset of its still 
position. However, a review of the existing studies on the calculation of the probability of failure of 
mooring systems shows that the probability of serviceability and functionality failure (the probability that 
the offset of a moored vessel exceeds an allowable limit) is typically not considered. Mousavi and 
Gardoni [9] discussed this probability, suggesting a method to evaluate the probability of serviceability 
failure in an offshore mooring system. However, the proposed method is based on the Monte Carlo 
simulations. The simulation-based methods are used for the reliability analysis of other complex systems 
considering serviceability limit states. For example, Hernandez-Fajardo (Hernandez-Fajardo 2012) used a 
Monte Carlo analysis to quantify the reliability of urban systems under seismic hazard accounting for the 
interdependency of the component fragilities. However, the simulation-based methods are usually time 
consuming and require extensive analyses. The proposed PRM can quantify the reliability significantly 
faster than such simulation-based approaches, accounting for the dependency of the component failures 
using the total probability rule and by computing the conditional probabilities of failure of components 
under all relevant configurations. PRM can also be used to quantify the likelihood of each scenario of 
system failure and compare the importance of the components to maintain system safety. A simplified 
example is used in the paper to highlight such application. 
In the following sections, the PRM is first formulated in general terms and explained also using an 
idealized system with two components. Then, as an illustration, it is used in two case studies for mooring 
systems. 
2 Progressive Reliability Method (PRM) 
A PRM calculates the failure probability of a structural system accounting for the progressive failure of 
system components until the system fails. In this method, two important terminologies are essential and 
frequently referred to, which are a) a configuration and b) a failure scenario. We will first introduce these 
terms and then discuss the method. 
System Configurations and Failure Scenarios 
We define a configuration as any possible state of the structure in terms of the possible state (failure or no 
failure) of its components. This definition is based on the assumption that any component may fail and is 
always either in the state of failed or in the state of not failed. Any structural system has an initial 
arrangement of its components. We call the initial state of a structural system (with no failed components) 
as the intact configuration. Under the effect of environmental loads, some components may fail. Any 
component failure leads the system to a new configuration. If a system has N components that may 
potentially fail, the total number of possible configurations is 2N , which includes the intact and 2 1N   
unique damaged configurations (including a configuration with all components failed). A system 
configuration can be shown using a binary row vector with N columns so that each column refers to the 
status of a component under that configuration; if component j fails, the j
th
 column is 1; otherwise it is 0. 
We refer to each configuration with
iX , where the index i is the decimal representation of the binary 
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vector corresponding to that configuration. The intact and the most damaged (all components failed) 
configurations are therefore shown as 
0 [000 0]
N
X  and 
2 1
[111 1]N
N

X , respectively.  
We define a failure scenario of 
iX as a group of steps (or the path) that leads the system from 0X (the 
intact configuration) to
iX . In general, the occurrence of iX can be through one or more failure scenarios. 
However, because in a structural system, the environmental loads usually vary within a time frame until 
reaching to a maximum load, and that the capacity of the components are random, it is almost impossible 
that in more than one component, the internal force exceed the capacity at the same time. Therefore, as 
suggested by Mousavi and Gardoni [9], we assume that one component fails at a time. This assumption 
means that after each component failure, any next failure may occur only after the loads are redistributed 
among the remaining components under the new configuration. With this assumption, if 
iX  has in failed 
components, the total number of possible unique failure scenarios leading to this configuration are: 
!i iK n            (1) 
Eq. (1) shows that if 
iX  has more than one failed components, multiple failure scenario is possible. We 
show the k
th
 possible failure scenario of 
iX  by 
 k
iX . 
 k
iX  is a matrix in which the first row is a binary 
vector describing the intact system,
0X , the middle rows (from the 2
nd
 to the ni
th
 row) are binary vectors 
describing the configurations that occur in between, and the last row is 
iX . The number of rows in this 
matrix is 1in  , since it includes a row for the intact system and in failure steps. We show the r
th
 row of 
the k
th
 possible failure scenario as 
 ,k r
iX , and we denote the j
th
 column of 
 ,k r
iX as 
 , ,k r j
ix , which is the 
status of component j in the r
th
 step of this failure scenario. 
The notation used for the configurations and failure scenarios can be illustrated in an example. In a 
system with 8 components, we show the configuration that the first and the third components failed 
using  5 00000101X , where the index 5 is the decimal number equivalent to the binary vector in the 
brackets. As suggested by Eq.(1), 5X has two failure scenarios. They are: 
 1
5
00000000
00000001
00000101
 
 
 
  
X , 
 2
5
00000000
00000100
00000101
 
 
 
  
X
 
We also note that the intact configuration of a system always has only one scenario, which 
is
 1
0 [00000000]X  in this example. 
Fragility Model 
In a PRM, the conditional probability of system failure under a given environmental load depends on the 
probability that each configuration occurs as well as the probability that the system fails under that 
configuration and demand. The configurations of a system constitute a finite set of mutually exclusive and 
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collectively exhaustive events because they are all unique and span all the possible options. Therefore, for 
a given demand (environmental load)
Ed , we can calculate the conditional probability of failure, or 
fragility [11, 12], as 
      
2 1
0
P 0 | P 0 | , P |
N
s E s i E i E
i
g d g d d


    X X       (2) 
where 
sg  is the system limit-state function defined such that P( 0 | , )s i Eg d X  indicates the probability 
of system failure under iX and Ed , and P( ) denotes the probability of the event described in the 
parenthesis. Eq. (2) formulates the fragility of a structural system based on the PRM. By using the 
likelihoods of the demands, the overall system failure probability can then be calculated using the total 
probability rule [13] 
            
      
2 1
0
2 1
0
P 0 P 0 | d P 0 | , P | d
1 P 0 | , P | d
N
N
s s E E E s i E i E E E
iB B
s i E i E E E
iB
g g d f d d g d d f d d
g d d f d d




       
    
 

X X
X X
 (3) 
where ( )f   is the probability density function (PDF) and B  is the domain of 
Ed .  
Eqs. (2) and (3) indicate that the number of possible  configurations in a system exponentially increases 
by increasing the number of components, implying that numerous deterministic analyses should be 
completed to evaluate the terms in these equations. However, as will be discussed later, it is expected that 
the term P( 0 | , )s i Eg d X becomes 0 or negligible for most configurations with multiple failed 
components. For any such 
iX and Ed , the rest of the terms in Eq. (3) become irrelevant. Moreover, any 
larger demand on that configuration or any progressive failures following that configuration also become 
irrelevant (i.e., their conditional probabilities of system failure are 0 too.) Finally, if some of the 
components form groups of series subsystems so that the failure of any component in the group makes 
other components of that group irrelevant to the system safety, then one deterministic analysis is 
sufficient to account for the failure of each series subsystem under a given demand and configuration. 
Therefore, to use Eq. (3), we only need to analyze the system for a limited number of configurations and 
range of demands with nonzero P( 0 | , )s i Eg d X . Hence, the decay of P( 0 | , )s i Eg d X with 
progressive failures has an important role on reducing the analyses of the PRM, because it identifies the 
configurations and the range of demands that are irrelevant in Eqs. (3). 
Calculating the Conditional Probability that System Does Not Fail under Each Configuration 
Eq. (3) requires calculating P( 0 | , )s i Eg d X  for all the relevant iX  and Ed . This conditional probability 
depends on the definition of system failure. For example, a structural failure can be defined based on the 
ultimate-strength failure of some structural components, the serviceability of the structure, or a 
combination of these two.  If a system failure is defined based on the ultimate-strength failure of certain 
components or certain number of components in a system, then if in 
iX , those components or number of 
components are already failed, then P( 0 | , )s i Eg d X  is 0; otherwise, it is 1. Similarly, if a system 
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failure is defined by a certain limit for the system response (e.g. deformation in a structure) and the 
modeling error is negligible, then P( 0 | , )s i Eg d X  is either 0 (when the failure criterion is met) or 1 
(when the failure criterion is not met). However, if the modeling error is not negligible, then 
P( 0 | , )s i Eg d X  is a number between 0 and 1 that should be estimated using a reliability analysis (e.g. 
FORM, SORM). 
Calculating the Conditional Probability of Each Configuration 
According to Eq. (3), for calculating the system failure probability, we should calculate the conditional 
probability of each configuration given the demand on the system. Because any configuration 
iX  can 
occur through any of the iK  failure scenarios leading to this configuration, we need to determine the 
conditional probabilities of all these failure scenarios to compute the conditional probability of this 
configuration. The failure scenarios of each configuration are mutually exclusive and collectively 
exhaustive; hence, we have  
      
11
P P P
i iK K
k k
i E i E i E
kk
d d d

 
  
 
X X X        (4) 
where 
  
  
 
, 1,
1
,
1: 0
P | P 0 | ,  P |
i
k n ji
i
n
k k rj
i E i E i E
rj x
d g d d



 
         
 
X X X
     
(5) 
in which 
jg is the limit-state function of component j and is non-positive when this component fails:  
j j jg c d         
    
(6) 
where jc and jd are the capacity and the demand of component j, respectively. Eq. (6) implies that if we 
know the probability density function (PDF) of jc and calculate jd given 
iX and Ed , we can calculate the 
fragility of this component [6, 7, 8]. In Eq. (5), the first term calculates the conditional probability of no 
failure in the remaining components given the probability space of 
iX and Ed , and the second term 
computes the conditional probability of previous failure steps that lead to this probability space given
Ed . 
Assuming that given 
iX  and Ed , the failures of the components are independent from each other, for the 
first term of Eq. (5) we have  
  
  
  , 1,, 1, : 0: 0
P 0 | , 1 P 0 | ,
k n jk n j ii
ii
j j
i E i E
j xj x
g d g d


 
    
 
 
X X
     
(7) 
Also, for the second term of Eq. (5), considering the Markov property of the steps of  k
iX  [14] (which is 
that any further failure in the system given its current state is independent from the previous failure steps 
that led to this state), for any  between 1 and 
in , we can write 
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        
1
, , 1 , ,
1 1
P | P | , P |
k r k k k r
i E i i E i E
r r
d d d
 
 


 
   
    
   
X X X X
     
(8) 
where 
            
  , ,
, 1 , , , ,
: 0
P | , P 0 | , 1 P 0 | ,
k j
i
k k k k kj j
i i E i i E i E
j x j j
d g d g d

    


  
 
         
  
X X X X
 
(9) 
Here j  indicates the component that is failing in the latest step (only j  satisfies 
( , 1, ) ( , , ) 1k j k ji ix x
    .) 
Eq. (8) recursively computes the conditional probability of the first  failure steps of  k
iX  given the 
initial condition of  ,1P( | ) 1
k
i Ed X  for any k, Ed , and i (because the system is always initially in the 
intact configuration), and Eq. (9) determines the conditional probability of each failure step of  k
iX  given 
that the previous failure step already has occurred. In Eq. (9), 
 ,k
i

  is an adjustment factor that takes 
into account the one-at-a-time-failure assumption. This adjustment is necessary because, given  
,k
i

X  and 
Ed , the summation of the conditional probabilities of all the possible immediate events (failure or no 
failure) after each failure step must be 1. Hence 
 
   
  
      
    
, ,
, ,, ,
,
: 0
,
, ,
: 0: 0
1 1 P 0 ,
P 0 , 1 P 0 ,
k j
i
k jk j
ii
kj
i E
j x
k
i
k kj j
i E i E
j x j jj x
g d
g d g d




 


  
 
   
 
 
 
   
 
 

 
X
X X
  (10) 
In Eq. (10), the numerator is the conditional probability of any further failure given 
 ,k
i

X  and Ed , and 
the denominator is the summation of the conditional probabilities of all the possible immediate one-at-a-
time-failure events given 
 ,k
i

X and Ed .  
We can use Eqs. (5-10) to compute the conditional probability of each 
 k
iX  and then Eq. (4) to calculate 
the conditional probability of 
iX  given Ed .  
Deterministic Analysis 
A PRM requires deterministic analysis of all the system configurations ( iX ) and demands ( Ed ) 
with P( 0 | , ) 0s i Eg d X . To do so, we should first discretize the environmental loads and calculate the 
response of the intact configuration and find the
 
range of 
Ed within B that 0P( 0 | , ) 0s Eg d X . This 
range is also the largest range of 
Ed that should be included in deterministic analysis of all the other 
configurations because all other configurations are products of failure in the intact system. We call this 
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range of 
Ed as the functional range of demands. We should then consider N new configurations where 
each of them has one fewer component compared to the intact configuration. For each new
iX , 
deterministic analysis should be performed. Then, only if P( 0 | , ) 0s i Eg d X  within the functional 
range of demands, all possible new configurations with one fewer components
 
should be considered. The 
functional range of demands with P( 0 | , ) 0s i Eg d X may shrink for each new configuration and thus 
for other configurations with further failures. Analysis of configurations with progressive failure should 
continue until P( 0 | , )s i Eg d X  becomes 0 or negligible for any Ed , which determines an end to that 
path of progressive failures that must be considered. At the end of deterministic analysis, the internal 
forces for all the demands and configurations with P( 0 | , ) 0s i Eg d X  are available and can be used to 
calculate the conditional probabilities of relevant configurations. 
In summary, in a PRM analysis, after the deterministic analyses are completed for all the configurations 
and demands with P( 0 | , ) 0s i Eg d X , all the corresponding failure scenarios have to be determined 
and their conditional probabilities must be computed. Then, using Eq. (4), the conditional probability of 
each configuration can be determined. Next, Eq. (2) gives the conditional probability of system failure. 
Finally, Eq. (3) computes the probability of failure of the system. The proposed formulation can be used 
also to compute the probability of exceeding a specified damage level by defining an appropriate system 
limit-state function 
sg  so that 0sg   indicates exceedance of the selected damage level. 
The computations for the PRM are illustrated using an example of a two-component structural system. 
3 Example of Two-component Structural System 
We illustrate the computations of the PRM using an example two-component structural system. In this 
example, given the environmental load, we calculate the conditional probabilities of 1) serviceability 
failure of the system, 2) ultimate-strength failure of the system (exceedance of one component failure in 
the system), and 3) failure of each component. The components of this system are two springs arranged in 
a parallel form. Each spring is under a tension of jd  induced by Ed  and has a fixed stiffness of 
jk  but 
an uncertain strength of jc . The cylinder is a rigid element with negligible friction with the two side-
walls. Because of the side-walls, Ed  will be distributed among the active (not failed) component(s) as 
axial loads only. The capacity of each component is independent from the other.  
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Figure 1 - Schematic view of the example two-component system 
 
For this example, we define the serviceability failure as if Δ, the cylinder displacement, exceeds Δ0, an 
allowable displacement, 
   serviceability 0P 0 | P |s E Eg d d            (11) 
where, considering the basic physics of this system, 
 
2
1
1
E
N
j j
i
j
d
k x


 
   
         (12) 
in which 
j
ix indicates the status of each component and is 1 if component j fails and is 0 otherwise, ( j is 
the component ID and is 1 or 2 in this example.) Eqs. (11) and (12) indicate that the conditional 
probabilities of serviceability failure cannot be calculated without conditioning on the statuses of the 
components because Δ is a function of
j
ix . Therefore, Eq. (2) can be used to compute this conditional 
probability as 
      
2 1 3
serviceability
0
0
P 0 | P | , P |
N
s E i E i E
i
g d d d
 

      X X     (13) 
We define the ultimate-strength failure of this system as if both the system components fail: 
   ultimate-strengthP 0 | P 2 |s E Eg d n d          (14) 
where n is the number of failed components in the system. This system has four possible configurations, 
which are: 
          0 1 2 3, , , 00 , 01 , 10 , 11 X X X X X        (15) 
d
1
, k
1
, c
1
 
d
2
, k
2
, c
2
 
d
1
, k
1
, c
1
 
d
2
, k
2
, c
2
 
dE 
 
 10 
 
Because the number of failed components is less than 2 for 0 1 2, ,  and X X X  and is 2 for 3X , based on Eq. 
(2), we can write 
       
3
ultimate-strength
3
0
P 0 | P 2 | , P | =P |s E i i E i E E
i
g d n d d d

    X X X    (16) 
The failure of each component is assessed using the component limit-state functions introduced in Eq. (6). 
In this example, we can write  
 1j j jid k x             (17) 
Thus, using Eq. (2), the conditional probability of failure of each component for this example will be 
           
3 3
0 0
P 0 | P 0 | , P | P | , P |j j j jE i E i E i E i E
i i
g d g d d c d d d
 
       X X X X  
            (18) 
Eqs. (13), (16), and (18) calculate the system and component conditional probabilities of failure 
given Ed and iX  based on the PRM.  
Here, we calculate the conditional probabilities of system and component failures under Ed  for 
some arbitrary input information. We assume that the component capacity, jc , follows a lognormal 
distribution. The component stiffness and the mean and standard deviation of each jc are given in Table 1. 
The environmental load Ed and the allowable displacement Δ0 are taken to be 50 kN and 1.2 m, 
respectively.  
 
Table 1. Properties of the Components in the Two-component Example System 
Component ID 
j
c (ln(m)) 
j
c (ln(m)) 
jk (kN/m) 
1 10 3 4.0×10
4
 
2 15 4.5 4.0×10
5
 
 
Considering the four possible configuration of this system in Eq. (15), five failure scenarios 
 (1) (1) (1) (1) (2)0 1 2 3 3, , , ,X X X X X  are possible. Using the input information for this example and Eqs. (12) and 
(17), the system displacements, and the component demands and conditional probabilities of failure under 
Ed  and all the failure steps (and their corresponding configurations) are computed as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Deterministic Results and Conditional probabilities of Component Failure under each 
 ,k
i

X  
Failure 
Step 
Corresponding 
iX  
Δ 1d  2d   1P 0 | ,i Eg d X   2P 0 | ,i Eg d X  
 ,1k
iX  0 [00]X  0.11 4.6×10
3
 4.6×10
4
 0.2994 0.1710 
   1,2 1,2
1 3X X  1 [01]X  1.25 5.0×10
4
 - 0.6077 1.0000 
   1,2 2,2
2 3X X  2 [10]X  0.13 - 5.0×10
4
 1.0000 0.1765 
   1,3 2,3
3 3X X  3 [11]X  ∞ - - 1.0000 1.0000 
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Results in Table 2 indicate that Δ is greater than Δ0 for 1X and 3X , but it is less than Δ0 for 0X and 2X ; 
thus, 0 1 0 3P( | , ) P( | , ) 1E Ed d       X X  and 0 0 0 2P( | , ) P( | , ) 0E Ed d       X X , 
which simplifies Eq. (13) to 
 
     serviceability 1 3P 0 P Ps E E Eg d d d  X X       (19) 
 
Hence, similar to the conditional probability of ultimate-strength failure in Eq. (16), the conditional 
probability of serviceability failure can be computed directly using the conditional probabilities of 
configurations.  
 
We calculate the conditional probability of all the failure scenarios using the information in Table 2 and 
the proposed PRM. The computations based on Eqs. (7), (8), and (9) are illustrated in Figure 2. In this 
figure, based on Eq. (10), the adjustment factor for the first failure is 
 
    
     
,1 1 1 0.2994 1 0.1710
1.1394
1 0.2994 0.1710 0.2994 1 0.1710
k
i
  
 
  
 
 
and the rest of the adjustment factors are 1. 
 
Figure 2- Calculating the conditional probabilities of configurations in the two-component structure 
 
Using the results in Figure 2 and considering Eqs. (4) and (5), we compute the conditional probabilities of 
all the configurations as 
 
   (1)0 0P | P | 0.5807E Ed d X X  
   (1)1 1P | P | 0.3923 0.1365 0.0535E Ed d   X X  
   (1)2 2P | P | 0.8235 0.2828 0.2329E Ed d   X X  
     (1) (2)3 3 3P | P | P | 0.6077 0.1365 0.1765 0.2828 0.1329E E Ed d d      X X X  
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Please note that as it is required (configurations are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive), 
 
       0 1 2 3P | P | P | P | 1E E E Ed d d d   X X X X . 
 
These results can be used to calculate the conditional probabilities of failure of the system and its 
components. Using Eqs. (19) and (16), the conditional probabilities of serviceability and ultimate-strength 
failure given Ed  become 0.1864 and 0.1329, respectively. Finally, using Eq. (18) and the probabilities in 
Table 2, the conditional probabilities of failure of the first and the second components under Ed  become 
0.5721 and 0.3268, respectively.  
 
One of the applications of the proposed PRM is identifying the most critical failure scenarios or 
components of a system, which can be used for maintenance planning and failure prevention. By 
assessing the likelihood of each failure scenario or configuration and their influence on system 
functionality, the significance of each component to the system safety can be assessed and compared. For 
example, results in Table 2 show that an initial failure of Component 1 already corresponds to a system 
failure (because even if Component 2 does not fail, the system displacement still exceeds the allowable 
limit.) Conversely, the system could remain functional after the initial failure of Component 2. Therefore, 
Component 1 seems to be the more critical to the safety of this system. Using the calculations in Figure 2, 
initial failure of Component 1 has a (conditional) probability of about 0.1365 and thus the likelihood that 
the system failure occurs through an initial failure in Component 1 equals 0.1365. In turn, if Component 2 
initially fails, this system still has a 0.8235 chance of survival. Based on the calculated probabilities, the 
likelihood that this system loses its functionality through an initial failure of Component 2 is 0.2828 × 
0.1765 = 0.0499. This implies that in the intact condition of this system, preventing the failure of 
Component 1 is about 2.7 times more important compared to Component 2 for maintaining the system 
safety. This information can be used as an input to maintenance planning of such system. Similar analysis 
can be performed in more complex systems to identify the likelihood of each failure scenarios and 
optimize their maintenance planning. 
4 Case Study: A Mooring System 
In this section, we show the application of the PRM for calculating the failure probability of offshore 
mooring systems. This section has two parts. First, the results of the PRM are compared with those we 
produced using Monte Carlo simulations following the algorithm developed by [9] for three mooring 
systems of different water depths under determined environmental loads. Then the PRM is used to 
identify a safer arrangement from among multiple mooring systems with a same number but different 
arrangements of the mooring lines under multidirectional environmental loads. Since the main function of 
a mooring system is to hold the vessel within allowable offset, a maximum allowable offset is used to 
define the system failure. However, because in practice it is common to set a limit for the allowable 
number of line failures, the effect of setting a limit for number of failed lines is also assessed. 
The analyses for this study were performed using Mooring-3D [9] based on quasi-static method; however, 
the proposed method can be used based on more advanced analysis methods (e.g. dynamic time or 
frequency domain). For calculation of the mean capacity of the suction caisson, Mooring-3D used the 
method recommended by Aubeny et al. [15]. For probabilistic analysis of this study, Mooring-3D first 
calculated the internal forces in all the mooring components and the vessel offset under all configurations 
and environmental loads with P( 0 | , ) 1s i Eg d X . Then, the PRM calculations or Monte Carlo 
simulations were performed. Because each mooring line is a series subsystem, one deterministic analysis 
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Load Direction  
was completed when assessing the component failures of each line under given demand and system 
configuration. In the Monte Carlo simulations, Mooring-3D was set to continue the simulations until 
either completing a hundred million realizations or reaching a C.O.V. of less than 0.005 for the system 
failure probability. 
In the first part of this case study, results of the PRM are compared with those of Monte Carlo simulations 
for three typical catenary mooring systems located at 500, 1000, and 2000 m waters. All the three 
mooring systems held a spar with a radius of 25 m. The allowable offsets of the spar under the determined 
100-year eastward loads of 850, 1350, and 800 kN were 20, 40, and 60 m (4% of the water depth) from its 
still position. The general properties of the mooring systems are given in Table 3. Figure 3 shows the 
intact configurations of the mooring lines in each system. 
 
 
Figure 3- Schematic view of the mooring Systems; A (left), B (middle), and C (right) 
 
Table 3. Basic Properties of the Mooring System in the First Part of the Case Study 
ID Arrangement 
Water  
Depth 
(m) 
Initial 
Pretension 
(KN) 
Mooring Line 
Segment Type IDs  
(Length, m) 
Suction Caisson 
Diameter × Length 
(m × m) 
Top Middle Bottom 
A 3 × 2 500 850 
4 
(150) 
5 
(1200) 
6  
(150) 
1.5 × 9.0 
B 4 × 2 1000 1500 
4 
(200) 
5 
(2000) 
6  
(400) 
1.8 × 10.8 
C 4 × 3 1500 400 
3 
(200) 
2 
(2500) 
1  
(630) 
1.1 × 6.6 
 
Each mooring line consisted of three segments and a suction caisson at the seafloor. Thus, the number of 
capacity random variables for Systems A, B, and C were 24, 32, and 48 respectively. In reference to Table 
3, the properties of the mooring segments types are provided in Table 4. All the mooring lines in each 
mooring system had the same properties. The seabed slope was taken to be negligible in all systems. Each 
mooring line was attached to a suction caisson at 67% of the length of the caisson below the seabed. The 
length-to-diameter ratios of all the suction caissons were taken to be six. The sizes of the suction caissons 
in each mooring system are also given in Table 3. The capacities of the suction caissons were calculated 
based on a soil shear strength of 3.8 kPa (80 psf) at the seabed with a linear gradient of 1.57 kPa/m (10 
psf/ft) below the seabed; the coefficient of variations (C.O.V.) of the lateral capacity of the suction 
caissons was taken to be 0.3 [16]. Both the lateral capacity of the suction caissons and the tensile strength 
of the mooring line segments were assumed to follow lognormal distributions; however, a lower-bound 
capacity of 55% the mean capacity was assumed for the suction caissons [16]. 
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Table 4. Basic Properties of Mooring Line Segments 
Segment Type ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Type 
Wire 
Rope 
Polyester Rig Wire 
R4 Anchor 
Chain 
Neptune 
Omega 
Insert Wire 
R5 Rig 
Chain 
Unit Length Wet 
Weight 
350 N/m 50 N/m 300 N/m 1264 N/m 334 N/m 1264 N/m 
Friction Coefficient 0.1 0.1 0.2 1 0.6 1 
EA (stiffness) 
4.7×10
5
 
kN 
2.2×10
5
 kN 
4.4×10
5
 
kN 
6.0×10
5
 kN 7.5×10
5
 kN 
6.0×10
5
 
kN 
Mean Tensile 
Strength 
7063 kN 7848 kN 6580 kN 6449 kN 8113 kN 8224 kN 
Strength C.O.V. 10% 15% 10% 15% 15% 15% 
Results of probabilistic analysis of Systems A, B, and C using both the PRM and the Monte Carlo 
simulations are given in Table 5. The results are compared in two levels. First, the deterministic analysis 
was limited to the intact configuration only, thus, a large offset or any component failure defined a system 
failure. Then, the functionality of all the configurations with one failed line was also assessed, so the 
system failure was defined as if at least two components fail or the vessel offset exceed the allowable 
offset. Comparison between the results of the two methods in this table suggests that the differences 
between the results of these two methods are negligible. This indicates the significant advantage of the 
PRM because it is a closed-form solution and its computations are considerably faster than those of 
Monte Carlo simulations. 
Table 5. Comparison between results of PRM and Monte Carlo simulations 
Mooring 
System ID 
System Fragility 
No Allowable Line Failure One Allowable Line Failure 
PRM Monte Carlo PRM Monte Carlo 
A 1.92×10
-2
 1.93×10
-2
 1.91×10
-2
 1.91×10
-2
 
B 8.43×10
-3
 8.52×10
-3
 8.40×10
-3
 8.47×10
-3
 
C 8.05×10
-2
 8.03×10
-2
 8.00×10
-2
 7.95×10
-2
 
 
The second part of this case study compares the safety of some alternative arrangements of the 12 
mooring lines of System C. As shown in Figure 4, the 12 mooring lines of System C can spread as 
individual lines (System D), or be arranged in three groups of four paired lines (System F), or in six 
groups of two paired lines (System H). Also, given the asymmetrical directional 100-year environmental 
loads as shown in Figure 5, rotating the asymmetrical Systems C and F for 30 degrees clockwise can lead 
to possibly safer Systems E and G respectively. Identifying the safest system from among all these 12-line 
alternatives is possible by calculating and comparing their fragilities using the PRM. In this assessment, 
again the system functionality is defined based on the vessel offset and the ultimate-strength failures of 
the lines. We considered three definitions for the system failure. The system was assumed to fail after 
either exceeding the allowable vessel offset of 60 m or the failure of at least one, two, or three lines. 
Therefore, the deterministic analyses were extended to all the possible system configurations with up to 2 
failed lines. 
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D)                      E)                                F)                         G)                         H) 
 
 
Figure 4. Schematic view of other alternative 12-line mooring systems  
 
  
Figure 5. The solid line indicates the 100-year environmental load in each direction 
 
Figure 6. The fragilities of 12-line mooring systems 
Fragility results of the PRM for the alternative systems with 12 mooring lines are shown in Figure 6. An 
overview of the results in this figure indicates that the calculated fragilities have reduced when a second 
line failure is also assessed compared to when a first line failure was considered only; however, 
N 
Load Direction 
(Degrees) 
N 
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accounting for a third line failure has not changed the fragilities. This indicates that after the two line 
failures, the system is no longer functional and thus the range of Ed with P( 0 | , ) 1s i Eg d X  is empty 
due to the vessel offset criterion; hence, this criterion governs such results. On the other hand, results in 
this figure show that the relative difference between the reliability of the alternative systems becomes 
more significant when accounting for higher number of progressive failures. For example, among the six 
analyzed arrangements of the 12-line mooring systems, System F has the highest and System C has the 
lowest safety. The fragility of System F is about 17% less than that of System C when the analysis 
accounts for the first failure only; however, this difference is increased to near 50% when the analysis is 
extended to a second line failure. These results highlight the significance of accounting for the damaged 
but functional configurations in the risk assessments. Results also suggest that Systems C, D, E, and H are 
equally safe despite the differences in their arrangement. In summary, System F is found to have the 
safest arrangement for 12-mooring lines for the given environmental load and alternative options. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper proposed a Progressive Reliability Method (PRM) for calculating the probability of failure of 
structural systems. The PRM is a closed-form solution based on known rules of probability to quantify the 
reliability of system functionality, ultimate-strength failure (exceeding a damage level), or component 
failures. In this method, all the possible system configurations in terms of the failure statuses of its 
components are first determined. By developing a fragility model, the response of the system under 
conditioned environmental loads is then evaluated. Using the probability density functions of the system 
component capacities (strengths) and results of structural (deterministic) analysis for the component 
demands (internal forces), the fragilities of the system under any configuration and environmental loads 
that is considered to be not-failed according to the definition of system failure is calculated. The total 
probability rule is then used to summarize the probabilistic results and calculate the system failure 
probability. The definition of failure in this method is flexible and can refer to the serviceability failure, 
the ultimate-strength failure of certain subsystems within the main system, a combination of the 
serviceability and ultimate-strength failures, or any other criteria as long as it can be checked given a 
configuration and demand. This method can be used to quantify the reliability and safety of complex 
structures. PRM can also be used to assess and compare the likelihoods of various failure scenarios and 
the importance of the system components to system safety, as illustrated in the example of a two-
component structure. Such information can be also used as input for maintenance planning or risk 
assessments of the system components. 
The PRM is illustrated in a case study for offshore mooring systems. First, the results of this method are 
compared with those of Monte Carlo simulations. Then a 12-line mooring system is analyzed under 
directional environmental loads to identify the safest arrangement and orientation among several possible 
options. The results show that the PRM results are very close to those of Monte Carlo simulations. They 
also indicated that for an example mooring system of this study, the reliability of this system is almost the 
same when the lines are arranged individually or in groups of two or three paired lines with different 
orientations. However, the reliability of the mooring system is considerably improved, up to 50%, when 
the lines are formed in three groups of four and oriented against the peak directional loads. Results show 
that the PRM must be extended to two damaged lines to accurately quantify the reliability of system 
concerning the allowable vessel offset in this example.  
 17 
 
6 References 
[1] Stiff J, Ferrari J, Ku A, Spong R. Comparative risk analysis of two fpso mooring configurations. 
Offshore Technology Conference 2013, Houston, TX, USA. 
[2] Shah AA, Umar A, Siddiqui NA. A methodology for assessing the reliability of taut and slack 
mooring systems against instability. J Ocean Engineering 2005; 32: 1216–1234. 
[3] Vazquez-Hernandez AO, Ellwanger GB, Sagrilo LVS. Reliability-based comparative study for 
mooring line design criteria. J Applied Ocean Research 2006; 28: 398-406. 
[4] Montes-Iturrizaga R, Heredia-Zavoni E, Silva-Gonz´alez F. Short communication on the estimation of 
mooring line characteristic resistance for reliability analysis. J Applied Ocean Research 2007; 29: 239–
241. 
[5] Grimea AJ, Langley RS. Lifetime reliability based design of an offshore vessel mooring. J Applied 
Ocean Research 2008; 30: 221-234. 
[6] Ku A, Stiff J, Huang B, Puskar F. MODU mooring reliability analysis for hurricane condition in the 
gulf of mexico. Offshore Technology Conference 2009, Houston, TX, USA. 
[7] Najjar SS, Gilbert RB. Importance of lower-bound capacities in the design of deep foundations. J 
Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering 2009; 135(7): 890-900. 
[8] Montes-Iturrizaga R, Heredia-Zavoni E, Silvia-Gonzalez F, Straub D. Nested reliability analysis of 
mooring lines for floating systems. J Applied Ocean Research 2012; 34: 107-115. 
[9] Mousavi ME, Gardoni P. Reliability-based design of offshore mooring systems. under review 2012 
[10] Hernandez-Fajardo I. Probabilistic fragility of interdependent urban systems subjected to seismic 
hazards. Rice University 2012; PhD dissertation. 
[11] Gardoni P, Der Kiureghian A, Mosalam KM. Probabilistic capacity models and fragility estimates 
for reinforced concrete columns based on experimental observations. J Engineering Mechanics 2012; 
128(10): 1024-1038. 
[12] Gardoni P, Mosalam KM, Der Kiureghian A. Probabilistic seismic demand models and fragility 
estimates for RC bridges. J Earthquake Engineering 2013; 7(sup001): 79-106. 
[13] Ang AH, Tang WH. Probability concepts in engineering: emphasis on applications in civil & 
environmental engineering. Wiley 2012 
[14] Ethier SN, Kurtz TG. Markov processes: characterization and convergence. New York: John Wiley 
& Sons Inc 1986. 
[15] Aubeny CP, Murff JD, Moon SK. Lateral undrained resistance of suction caisson anchors. Int. J 
Offshore and Polar Engineering 2001; 11(3): 211-219. 
 18 
 
[16] Najjar SS, Gilbert RB. Importance of lower-bound capacities in the design of deep foundations. J 
Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering 2009; 135(7): 890-900. 
 
